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ABSTRACT
Background
The threat of avian influenza and the 2004–2005 influenza vaccine supply shortage in the
United States have sparked a debate about optimal vaccination strategies to reduce the burden
of morbidity and mortality caused by the influenza virus.
Methods and Findings
We present a comparative analysis of two classes of suggested vaccination strategies:
mortality-based strategies that target high-risk populations and morbidity-based strategies that
target high-prevalence populations. Applying the methods of contact network epidemiology
to a model of disease transmission in a large urban population, we assume that vaccine
supplies are limited and then evaluate the efficacy of these strategies across a wide range of
viral transmission rates and for two different age-specific mortality distributions.
We find that the optimal strategy depends critically on the viral transmission level
(reproductive rate) of the virus: morbidity-based strategies outperform mortality-based
strategies for moderately transmissible strains, while the reverse is true for highly transmissible
strains. These results hold for a range of mortality rates reported for prior influenza epidemics
and pandemics. Furthermore, we show that vaccination delays and multiple introductions of
disease into the community have a more detrimental impact on morbidity-based strategies
than mortality-based strategies.
Conclusions
If public health officials have reasonable estimates of the viral transmission rate and the
frequency of new introductions into the community prior to an outbreak, then these methods
can guide the design of optimal vaccination priorities. When such information is unreliable or
not available, as is often the case, this study recommends mortality-based vaccination priorities.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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In response to the 2004–2005 inﬂuenza vaccine shortage,
the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) restricted vaccines to those most at risk for hospital-
ization and death — healthy infants, elderly individuals, and
individuals with chronic illnesses. This strategy may be limited
by the failure of vaccines to yield adequate protection for
high-risk individuals [1,2] and the lesser roles played by infants
and the elderly in disease transmission—they typically do not
introduce inﬂuenza into households or other social groups.
Inﬂuenza outbreaks are believed to hinge, instead, on
transmission by healthy school children [3–6], college
students, and employed adults who have many daily contacts
and are highly mobile [7]. Thus, epidemiologists have
suggested an alternative approach: vaccinate school-age
children to slow the spread of disease and thereby indirectly
decrease mortality [8,9]. Several studies support this strategy.
Monto et al. immunized school children in Tecumseh,
Michigan, with inactivated inﬂuenza vaccine in 1968 and
found lower total morbidity than in a matching community
during a wave of inﬂuenza A (H3N2) [10]. Reichart et al. argue
that mandatory inﬂuenza vaccination of school children in
Japan from 1962 to 1987 reduced incidence and mortality
among the elderly [11]. Recently, Longini et al. used
mathematical models to show that, under certain assump-
tions, vaccinating 80% of all school-age children is almost as
effective as vaccinating 80% of the entire population [8].
School-based vaccination programs have the additional
beneﬁts of high coverage, high efﬁcacy, and minimal side
effects [12].
In a similar spirit, others have suggested contact-based
priorities that target individuals with the highest numbers of
potentially disease-causing contacts [13–15]. This assumes
that vulnerability is directly proportional to the number of
contacts, and that removing the most vulnerable individuals
from the transmission chain will maximally decrease disease
spread. Identifying high-contact individuals in a community,
however, may be difﬁcult in practice.
Here we apply tools from contact network epidemiology
[16–19] to evaluate vaccination strategies for a spectrum of
inﬂuenza strains when vaccine supplies are limited. We use a
realistic model of contact patterns in an urban setting to
compare mortality-based strategies that target high-risk
individuals to morbidity-based strategies that target demo-
graphics with high attack rates. We assess the efﬁcacy of these
measures for two substantially different virulence patterns,
one based on mortality estimates from annual inﬂuenza
epidemics and the other based on mortality estimates from
the 1918 inﬂuenza pandemic. In addition, we consider the
impact of vaccination delay and multiple imported cases on
the relative effectiveness of the vaccination strategies.
Methods
Population Model
We built a contact network model that captures the
interactions that underlie respiratory disease transmission
within a city. The model is based on demographic informa-
tion for Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. In the model,
each person is represented as a vertex, and interactions
between people are represented as edges between appropri-
ate vertices. Each person is assigned an age based on
Vancouver census data, and age-appropriate activities
(school, work, hospital, etc.). Interactions among individuals
reﬂect household size, employment, school, and hospital data
for Vancouver. The model population includes ;257,000
individuals. For further details and sensitivity analysis, see
Protocol S1 and Figures S1 and S2.
Our contact network model contains undirected edges that
reﬂect the possibility of disea s et r a n s m i s s i o ni ne i t h e r
direction between two individuals, and directed edges that
indicate the possibility of disease transmission from one
person to another, but not the reverse (see Figure 1). Directed
Figure 1. Network Model
(A) A schematic of a network model for an urban population. Each individual is a vertex in the network, and edges represent potentially disease-causing
contacts between individuals. Directed edges (with arrows) represent transmission occurring in only one direction.
(B) We model vaccination in a population by removing nodes from the population network, and the edges that are attached to them.
HCW, health-care worker.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g001
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Analysis of Influenza Vaccinationedges model the possibility of transmission from an infected
member of the general public to health-care workers during
hospital visits. In a typical epidemic, most individuals infected
with inﬂuenza do not seek hospital care. We assume that only
high-risk groups (infants and elderly) visit hospitals upon
infectionand thus have opportunities toinfect the health-care
workers who treat them [20]. We also consider a more extreme
scenario in which almost all infected individuals are at risk for
serious complications and thus seek medical care upon
infection.
Influenza Mortality
Mortality rates differ both across demographic groups and
among strains of inﬂuenza (see Table 1 and Protocol S1), and
thus the optimal vaccination priorities are likely to depend
on the virulence of the circulating strains. We consider two
substantially different mortality models. The ﬁrst assumes
age-speciﬁc mortality rates typical of interpandemic out-
breaks of ﬂu, which are based on national viral surveillance
data reported for 1977–1999 [21]. The rate is highest for the
elderly, followed by infants, who are most at risk for death
caused directly by inﬂuenza or pneumonia or by primary
respiratory or circulatory complications. The second model,
which was intentionally chosen for contrast, assumes mortal-
ity rates to be as estimated for the 1918 ﬂu pandemic. These
are high for healthy young adults aged 20–40 y and children
under 5 y and low for older children and the elderly [22]
(Table 1). There are, however, conﬂicting estimates for the
elderly [23,24]. We use a low estimate to achieve the greatest
departure from the interpandemic model, and thus to
ascertain the sensitivity of our results to assumptions about
inﬂuenza mortality. Henceforth, we refer to these two models
as interpandemic and pandemic, respectively. We consider
other reported mortality rates in Protocol S1 and Figure S3.
Vaccine Priorities
We modeled targeted pre-season vaccination with single
doses of inactivated inﬂuenza vaccine by removing select
individuals (vertices) and all their contacts (edges) from the
network before predicting the spread of inﬂuenza (see Figure
1). The fraction of the vaccinated population that becomes
fully protected is based on demographic-speciﬁc vaccine
efﬁcacy estimates (Table 2). For a vaccine of efﬁcacy E and
coverage C for a particular group, we remove a fraction C E of
individuals from that group. This assumes that this fraction is
fully protected (100% effectiveness) while the remaining
fraction C (1  E) of vaccinated individuals are not protected
at all. In reality, most of the vaccinated individuals will enjoy
some partial protection. We have tested our method with
simulations to conﬁrm that it provides a reasonable model
for partial efﬁcacy (see Protocol S1 and Figure S5).
We evaluate four strategies (Figure 2): (1) a mortality-based
strategy that, like the recent CDC strategy, targets demo-
graphics that are most vulnerable to health complications or
death (infants, the elderly, and health-care workers for
interpandemic ﬂu; and infants, adults, and health-care
workers for pandemic ﬂu); (2) a morbidity-based strategy,
similar to the priorities suggested by Longini et al [8] and
Monto et al.[10], that targets school-aged children and school
staff, and thereby aims to reduce mortality through herd
protection [25]; (3) a mixed strategy that targets demo-
graphics with high attack rates (children) and high mortality
Table 1. The Age-Specific Mortality Distributions for Typical Annual Influenza Epidemics and an Example Influenza Pandemic
Group Mortality Rate for Influenza
Epidemic(per 10,000 Cases)
Mortality Rate for Influenza
Pandemic (per 10,000 Cases)
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 0.30 80.0
Preschool children (3–5 y) 0.08 50.0
Children (5–18 y) 0.08 20.0
Adults (18–50 y) 0.07 70.0
Elders (.50 y) 12.00 5.0
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t001
Table 2. Historical Influenza Vaccination Coverage Levels and Inactivated Vaccine Efficacy Levels Used in This Study
Group Vaccination Coverage Levels Inactivated Vaccine Efficacy
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Preschool children (3–5 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Children (5–18 y) 30%–75% 77%–91%
Adults (18–50 y) 30%–75% 70%–90%
Elders (.50 y) 67%–85% 30%–50%
Health-care workers 25%–38% 70%–90%
Elders in care facilities 90%–95% 30%–50%
Sources: [12,26].
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t002
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org October 2006 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e387 1818
Analysis of Influenza Vaccinationrates (infants and the elderly for interpandemic ﬂu; infants
and adults for pandemic ﬂu), similar to that suggested by
Longini and Halloran [9]; and (4) a contact-based strategy
that removes a fraction of the most connected individuals.
We modeled the mortality-based strategy by removing
infants, the elderly, and health-care workers from the
network based on reported maximum coverage and efﬁcacy
levels for these demographics [12,26] (Table 2). This yielded
13% coverage of the total population (Table 3). We then
implemented the remaining strategies to match this overall
coverage level. (We consider the sensitivity of our results to
the coverage level in Protocol S1 and Figure S4.) Targeted
groups were removed in proportion to demographic-speciﬁc
vaccine coverage levels reported in the 2002 National Health
Interview Survey by the CDC [26], and the vaccine efﬁcacy
levels were based on age-speciﬁc rates reported for inacti-
vated inﬂuenza vaccine [12].
Epidemiological Analysis
We deﬁne the transmissibility of a disease, T, as the average
probability that an infectious individual will transmit the
disease to a susceptible individual with whom he or she has
contact. This term summarizes important features of disease
propagation including the contact rates among individuals,
the duration of the infectious period, and the per contact
probability of transmission. This per contact probability of
transmission, in turn, summarizes the susceptibility (immune
response) and the infectiousness (viral shedding) of individ-
uals. Our analysis allows for variation in transmission rates
from one individual to the next, but it assumes that these
rates vary randomly with respect to the underlying contact
patterns. There is evidence, however, that transmission rates
may vary systematically among demographics, and, in
particular, may be highest for children [27]. In Protocol S1
and Figure S6, we consider modiﬁed models that explicitly
Figure 2. Vaccination Strategies
The demographic distribution of vaccines according to each of the strategies: the black bars reflect the fraction of available vaccines given to each age
group (and thus will always sum to one). The gray bars reflect the proportion of each demographic that is effectively immunized, and thus take into
account the size of the demographic and the demographic-specific vaccine efficacy.
HCW, health-care worker.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g002
Table 3. Vaccination Coverage and Efficacy Levels Assumed for the Mortality-Based Vaccination Strategy
Group Implemented Coverage Level Vaccine Efficacy Effective Coverage Level
Infants and toddlers (6 mo–3 y) 75% (4.1% of total population) 90% 68%
Elders (.50 y) 85% (7.5% of total population) 50% 43%
Health-care workers 38% (0.4% of total population) 90% 34%
Elders in care facilities 95% (0.7% of total population) 50% 48%
Total 12.7% of total population
The effective coverage level is a product of the implemented coverage level and the vaccine efficacy for each group.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.t003
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rates and show that this additional complexity does not alter
the results reported below.
T is linearly related to the key epidemiological parameter
R0. In particular, R0 is equal to T j, where j is a measure of the
connectivity within the population (network) [19,28]. Intui-
tively, R0 is largest for highly contagious pathogens (repre-
sented by a high T) spreading through densely connected
populations (represented by a high j). R0¼1 corresponds to a
critical transmissibility value Tc, above which a population is
vulnerable to large-scale epidemics and below which only
small outbreaks occur [28].
We used methods based on contact network epidemiology
[16–19] to predict the fate of an inﬂuenza outbreak as a
function of the average transmissibility T of the strain. For any
contact network, one can mathematically predict the epi-
demic threshold (Tc), the average size of a small outbreak (s),
the average size (Se) and probability (Pe) of a large-scale
epidemic, and demographic-speciﬁc attack rates for an
epidemic, should one occur. Mortality is predicted by multi-
plying the expected number of infections for a given group by
the age-speciﬁc mortality rate assumed for that group. (See
Protocol S1 for additional details.)
To verify these mathematical predictions, we performed
numerical simulations of disease spread assuming a simple
susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model. Beginning with
a susceptible network and a single infected case, we iteratively
take each currently infected vertex, infect each of its
susceptible contacts with probability T, and then change the
status of the original vertex to ‘‘recovered.’’ These simulations
are generally consistent with the mathematical calculations
(Figure 3), and thus we primarily report the analytical results.
Immunity from prior outbreaks is an important aspect of
interpandemic inﬂuenza transmission. There are two alter-
native approaches to modeling residual immunity. One is to
remove individuals with naturally acquired immunity from
the network, as we have done for vaccination. The other is to
assume that the distribution of transmission probabilities
reﬂects pre-existing immunity. If there is widespread partial
immunity, then there will be large numbers of edges along
which transmission is very unlikely, leading to a lower average
transmissibility across the population. Here we have not
removed individuals with naturally acquired immunity from
the population, but instead assume that the transmissibility
values are averaged over all edges in the network, including
those leading to or from such individuals.
Model Validation
We compared the age-speciﬁc attack rates predicted by our
models to those reported for both interpandemic ﬂu and the
1918 pandemic (Figure 4). First, we considered data from the
interpandemic outbreak of 1977–1978 reported by Longini et
al. [3]. They reported age-speciﬁc attack rates from a
household study of 159 families in Seattle, Washington,
United States, in which infection was determined through
hemagglutination-inhibition assays. We do not know the
exact age-speciﬁc inﬂuenza vaccination coverage rates during
this period. We assumed that the population was protected
according the current CDC strategy (the mortality-based
strategy), and then used our model to predict demographic-
speciﬁc attack rates. We estimated the average transmissi-
Figure 3. Morbidity and Mortality for Influenza Epidemics and Pandemics
Expected (A) attack rate and (B) mortality rate as a function of T for annual influenza epidemics.
Expected (C) attack rate and (D) mortality rate as a function of T for an influenza pandemic.
The dots in (A) show simulation results for comparison. Estimates of R0 for interpandemic and pandemic flu are shown as gray lines in (B) and (D),
respectively.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g003
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Analysis of Influenza Vaccinationbility of the disease by solving for the value of T that produces
the observed total attack rate (T¼0.07, or R0¼1.2). Thus, the
total attack rate was constrained to match perfectly the
observed total attack rate, while the demographic-speciﬁc
attack rates were free to vary. The predictions of the model
are consistent with the observed epidemiology (Figure 4A).
We note, however, that the reliability of this comparison is
limited by the small sample size of the Seattle study and the
lack of information about vaccine coverage and efﬁcacy
during that period.
Second, we made a similar comparison using age-speciﬁc
attack rate data for the 1918 pandemic that were collected
and reported by Frost in 1920 [29]. The data are based on a
survey of approximately 146,000 people (representing a
cross-section of the US population, which at the time
numbered 103 million). Infection rates for inﬂuenza were
based on self-reported responses by study participants. There
was no vaccination available for inﬂuenza at the time in the
US, and thus we made epidemiological predictions assuming
no vaccination. Again, we began by solving for an average
transmissibility that produces the observed total attack rate
and found T ¼ 0.09 (or R0 ¼ 1.8). As a consistency check, this
estimate agrees very closely with the recently revised estimate
for the pandemic inﬂuenza reproductive rate [30], based on
US and UK 1918 pandemic mortality data. Assuming this
average transmissibility, we predicted demographic-speciﬁc
attack rates and found that they matched the observed
patterns reasonably well (Figure 4B).
Results/Discussion
Direct versus Indirect Intervention Methods
For interpandemic inﬂuenza, morbidity-based and contact-
based strategies appear to offer signiﬁcant indirect protec-
tion of unvaccinated individuals who would otherwise
become infected via transmission chains that have now been
severed by vaccination. Indeed, for all strains, these two
strategies are predicted to yield the lowest attack rates (Figure
3A). If the primary objective is to reduce morbidity from
inﬂuenza, then the morbidity-based and contact-based
strategies are always preferred, although their advantage
decreases as disease transmissibility (T) increases.
One might argue that the primary objective of intervention
should be to reduce mortality rather than morbidity. The
CDC’s recent vaccine priorities seem to be based on this
objective [12]. In terms of mortality, there is a speciﬁc
transmissibility value below which the morbidity-based and
contact-based strategies are superior and above which the
mortality-based strategies are superior (Figure 3B). To clarify
this transition (which occurs for our network at T¼0.13), we
show in Figure 5 the proportions of the adult and elderly
subpopulations that are infected, vaccinated, and uninfected
for the two strategies at two values of T. The uninfected class
is made up of individuals that have neither been vaccinated
nor get infected. Some of these individuals would not be
infected in any case, and the rest are those that would be
infected without a vaccination program but are now
protected by the effects of herd immunity. Below the
transition point (for instance, at T ¼ 0.1), the elderly are
protected more by the indirect effects of the morbidity-based
strategy than by the direct effects of the mortality-based
strategy. Above the transition point (for instance, at T¼0.15),
the indirect protection by the morbidity-based strategy drops
substantially, resulting in a higher proportion of elderly
individuals infected than with the mortality-based strategy. A
similar reversal occurs for infants. The mixed strategy—a
combination of the morbidity-based and mortality-based
strategies—is never the optimal strategy (Figure 3B), yet may
Figure 4. Model Validation
Comparison of predicted to observed age-specific attack rates for (A) the 1977–1978 influenza season and (B) the 1918 influenza pandemic.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g004
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Analysis of Influenza Vaccinationbe an advisable bet-hedging strategy when there is great
uncertainty about the transmissibility of the circulating
strain.
Estimates of R0 for interpandemic ﬂu range between 1.0
and 2.4 for the A (H2N2) and A (H3N2) strains of inﬂuenza
([31,32] and references therein). Since inﬂuenza vaccines have
been used in the US since 1944, these estimates may be based
on partially vaccinated populations. Conservatively assuming
that the populations in question had somewhere between no
coverage at all and 13% coverage according to the contact-
based strategy, these values of R0 (1.0 , R0 , 2.4) correspond
to 0.06 , T , 0.26 in our model (See Protocol S1.) This range
straddles the critical cross-points in Figure 3B, leaving some
ambiguity as to which strategy will be most effective. We note,
however, that the higher the transmissibility, the more dire
the public health situation, and mortality-based strategies are
predicted to be more effective for highly contagious strains.
Highly Virulent Influenza
The demographic-speciﬁc mortality rates reported for
inﬂuenza vary considerably (Protocol S1 and Figure S3). To
assess whether control recommendations can be generalized
to new or anomalous strains of inﬂuenza, we analyzed a
second, extreme scenario. Worldwide inﬂuenza pandemics
are characterized by much higher levels of morbidity and
mortality than annual epidemics, and have occurred three
times in the last century. The 1918–1919 ‘‘Spanish Inﬂuenza’’
caused more than 500,000 deaths in the US and an estimated
20 million deaths worldwide [33]. Based on data from the
1918 pandemic, we modiﬁed our model in three respects: the
number of people expected to seek medical attention upon
infection, the age-speciﬁc mortality rates, and (consequen-
tially) the age groups targeted by the mortality-based and
mixed strategies.
Despite these substantial differences, the predictions for
pandemic and interpandemic ﬂu are qualitatively similar.
The morbidity-based and contact-based strategies outper-
form mortality-based strategies in terms of resulting mortal-
ity for low values of T, but not for higher values. There is a
quantitative difference, however, in that the transition point
between these two regimes happens at a higher transmissi-
bility for pandemic ﬂu than for interpandemic ﬂu (Figure 3D
versus 3B). In other words, morbidity-based strategies are
preferred for a wider spectrum of pandemic ﬂu strains than
of interpandemic ﬂu strains. This stems, in part, from the
much larger size of the high-risk population (adults) for
pandemic ﬂu. Under vaccine limitations (13% in this case),
the mortality-based strategy protects a much smaller fraction
of the pandemic high-risk population than of the interpan-
demic high-risk population. We have found that increasing
the vaccination level to 20% does not change the qualitative
results (shown in Protocol S1 and Figure S4). Patel et al. have
recently performed a similar sensitivity analysis on vaccine
availability [34].
T h er e p r o d u c t i v en u m b e r( R0) for the 1918 Spanish
Inﬂuenza is estimated to have been between 1.8 and 4.0
[29,35], corresponding to T between 0.09 and 0.43 in our
model (see Protocol S1). Once again, this range straddles the
critical cross-point in Figure 3D, leaving some ambiguity as to
which strategy will be most effective. It can be seen, however,
that mortality-based strategies are predicted to be more
effective across the upper two-thirds of this interval.
Multiple Introductions
Most communities do not exist in isolation, and thus
experience multiple independent introductions of the virus
during a typical ﬂu season. Many models of vaccination
strategies [8,9], however, ignore this possibility. To better
Figure 5. Direct versus Indirect Intervention
The figure shows the proportions of the adult and elderly populations that are infected, not infected (neither vaccinated nor infected), and vaccinated
for two different values of T for the mortality-based strategy versus the morbidity-based strategy.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g005
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ﬂu, one must consider a meta-population model that includes
connectivity among cities. Here we address the consequences
of multiple introductions, but not the likelihood of such
events in the ﬁrst place. For mathematical simplicity, we
assumed that multiple independent introductions occur
simultaneously (and initial cases are chosen randomly) at
the start of an outbreak, which yields conservative estimates
of their detrimental impact. The probability of an epidemic
increases with the number of introductions for all strategies,
thereby reducing the advantage of the morbidity-based and
contact-based strategies for mildly transmissible strains. For
example, if there are four independent introductions of ﬂu,
morbidity-based strategies are inferior to mortality-based
strategies above T¼0.12 (R0¼2.1). In contrast, this shift takes
place at T¼0.13 (R0¼2.3), when there is a single importation
of disease (Figure 6).
Delayed Intervention
A similar analysis provides insight into the impact of a
delay in intervention until after an outbreak is already in
progress, as occurred during the 2000–2001 ﬂu season [36].
This scenario may also be particularly relevant to pandemic
inﬂuenza, for which vaccines may only become available well
into an outbreak, if at all. We simulate the implementation of
vaccination after a certain proportion of the population has
already been infected. We call this proportion ‘‘delay.’’ The
morbidity-based strategies are more sensitive to such delays
than mortality-based methods are (Figure 7). They are
predicted to be inferior above T ¼ 0.11 (R0 ¼ 1.9) if there is
Figure 7. The Epidemiological Impact of Delayed Vaccination
(A) The morbidity-based strategy is more effective than the mortality-based strategy when T is less than 0.13 only if there is there is no delay in
vaccination. When vaccines are given after 10% of the population has already been infected, the morbidity-based strategy becomes relatively less
effective (and is the preferred strategy only when T is less than 0.11).
(B) At T¼0.125, the morbidity-based strategy is superior to the mortality-based strategy when there is no delay, but inferior for any amount of delay.
Each of the values is an average taken across 500 epidemic simulations on the contact network.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g007
Figure 6. The Epidemiological Impact of Multiple Introductions of Disease
(A) The morbidity-based strategy is more effective than the mortality-based strategy when T is less than 0.13 only if there is only a single introduction of
disease. With four introductions of disease, however, the morbidity-based strategy becomes less effective (and is the preferred strategy only when T is
less than 0.12.)
(B) At T¼0.125, the morbidity-based strategy is superior to the mortality-based strategy when there is a single introduction, but inferior when there is
more than one introduction.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030387.g006
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Analysis of Influenza Vaccinationa 10% delay in vaccination, compared to T ¼ 0.13 (R0 ¼ 2.3)
when there is no delay.
Figures 6 and 7 suggest that a delay in vaccination may be
less detrimental than multiple introductions of disease into a
population. Multiple independent introductions of disease
provide multiple independent opportunities to spark a large-
scale epidemic. In the absence of vaccination, the probability
of an epidemic increases considerably as the number of
independent introductions increases (Protocol S1). In con-
trast, a delay in vaccination allows a single case to grow into a
connected cluster of cases, which are not independent of each
other with respect to the numbers and the identities of their
contacts. The probability of an epidemic increases with the
number of individuals in the initial cluster, but not as quickly
as it does with the addition of independent cases.
Conclusion
In this study, we have applied the analytical methods of
contact network epidemiology to evaluate current and
proposed inﬂuenza vaccination priorities. In contrast to
prior studies [9,34], we have modeled a relatively large
population and the entire spectrum of viral transmission
rates possible for inﬂuenza; in addition, we have accounted
for multiple introductions of disease and the possibility of a
delay in vaccination. The efﬁcacy of mortality-based strat-
egies (like the CDC 2004 vaccination priorities [12]) and
morbidity-based strategies (like school-based vaccination
[8,9]) depend on (i) the transmissibility (reproductive num-
ber) of the strain, (ii) age-speciﬁc mortality rates, (iii) the
vulnerability of the community to multiple introductions,
and (iv) the timing of implementation. With respect to
minimizing mortality, mortality-based strategies are generally
preferred to morbidity-based strategies for strains with high
transmission rates and in communities experiencing either
delayed intervention or multiple introductions.
Thus, mortality-based strategies may be the prudent choice
for outbreaks of new or atypical strains of inﬂuenza, when
public health ofﬁcials may not have reliable estimates for all
(or any) of the ﬁrst three inputs, and vaccination may be
delayed. The predictions appear to hold for a range of age-
speciﬁc mortality distributions estimated for past outbreaks
of epidemic and pandemic ﬂu. Although this suggests that
similar recommendations may be appropriate for pandemic
ﬂu, they will be irrelevant in the very likely case that vaccines
are not available at the start of an outbreak.
Ifmorepreciseestimatesofthekeyinputsbecomeavailable,
then this approach can be applied to design optimal (rather
than just prudent) priorities. To reduce the existing uncer-
tainty in estimates of inﬂuenza transmission and mortality
rates, we must improve surveillance methods for gathering
real-time data and develop new statistical methods for
examining data from both historical and future outbreaks, as
were developed to estimate R0 for SARS during the 2003
outbreaks [37]. Current estimates of ﬂu transmission rates are
based primarily on compartmental models of disease trans-
mission ([31,32] and references therein). Some of the variation
in the estimates of R0 may stem from variation in contact
patterns among different populations rather than intrinsic
variation in the probability of disease transmission between
individuals who come in contact with one another. While
compartmental models often do not capture such contact
heterogeneity, contact network models allow one to factor out
variation in contact patterns when estimating transmission
rates. Thus, the development of better estimation methods
using contact network models may yield more accurate
estimates of some key epidemiological parameters.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Influenza—a viral infection of the nose, throat, and airways
that is transmitted in airborne droplets released by coughing or
sneezing—is a serious public health threat. Most people recover quickly
from influenza, but some individuals, especially infants, old people, and
individuals with chronic health problems, can develop pneumonia and
die. In the US, seasonal outbreaks (epidemics) of flu cause an estimated
36,000 excess deaths annually. And now there are fears that avian
influenza might start a human pandemic—a global epidemic that could
kill millions. Seasonal outbreaks of influenza occur because flu viruses
continually change the viral proteins (antigens) to which the immune
system responds. ‘‘Antigenic drift’’—small changes in these proteins—
means that an immune system response that combats flu one year may
not provide complete protection the next winter. ‘‘Antigenic shift’’—
large antigen changes—can cause pandemics because communities
have no immunity to the changed virus. Annual vaccination with
vaccines based on the currently circulating viruses controls seasonal flu
epidemics; to control a pandemic, vaccines based on the antigenically
altered virus would have to be quickly developed.
Why Was This Study Done? Most countries target vaccination efforts
towards the people most at risk of dying from influenza, and to health-
care workers who are likely come into contact with flu patients. But is
this the best way to reduce the burden of illness (morbidity) and death
(mortality) caused by influenza, particularly at the start of a pandemic,
when vaccine would be limited? Old people and infants are much less
likely to catch and spread influenza than school children, students, and
employed adults, so could vaccination of these sections of the
population—instead of those most at risk of death—be the best way
to contain influenza outbreaks? In this study, the researchers used an
analytical method called ‘‘contact network epidemiology’’ to compare
two types of vaccination strategies: the currently favored mortality-based
strategy, which targets high-risk individuals, and a morbidity-based
strategy, which targets those segments of the community in which most
influenza cases occur.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? Most models of disease
transmission assume that each member of a community is equally likely
to infect every other member. But a baby is unlikely to transmit flu to, for
example, an unrelated, housebound elderly person. Contact network
epidemiology takes the likely relationships between people into account
when modeling disease transmission. Using information from Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada, on household size, age distribution, and
occupations, and other factors such as school sizes, the researchers built
a model population of a quarter of a million interconnected people. They
then investigated how different vaccination strategies controlled the
spread of influenza in this population. The optimal strategy depended on
the level of viral transmissibility—the likelihood that an infectious person
transmits influenza to a susceptible individual with whom he or she has
contact. For moderately transmissible flu viruses, a morbidity-based
vaccination strategy, in which the people most likely to catch the flu are
vaccinated, was more effective at containing seasonal and pandemic
outbreaks than a mortality-based strategy, in which the people most
likely to die if they caught the flu are vaccinated. For highly transmissible
strains, this situation was reversed. The level of transmissibility at which
this reversal occurred depended on several factors, including whether
vaccination was delayed and how many times influenza was introduced
into the community.
What Do These Findings Mean? The researchers tested their models by
checking that they could replicate real influenza epidemics and
pandemics, but, as with all mathematical models, they included many
assumptions about influenza in their calculations, which may affect their
results. Also, because the contact network used data from Vancouver,
their results might not be applicable to other cities, or to nonurban
areas. Nevertheless, their findings have important public health
implications. When there are reasonable estimates of the viral trans-
mission rate, and it is known how often influenza is being introduced
into a community, contact network models could help public health
officials choose between morbidity- and mortality-based vaccination
strategies. When the viral transmission rate is unreliable or unavailable
(for example, at the start of a pandemic), the best policy would be the
currently preferred strategy of mortality-based vaccination. More
generally, the use of contact network models should improve estimates
of how infectious diseases spread through populations and indicate the
best ways to control human epidemics and pandemics.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030387.
  US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention information about
influenza for patients and professionals, including key facts on
vaccination
  US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases feature on
seasonal, avian, and pandemic influenza
  World Health Organization fact sheet on influenza, with links to
information on vaccination
  UK Health Protection Agency information on seasonal, avian, and
pandemic influenza
  MedlinePlus entry on influenza
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